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I. Of Backpacks and Footprints – the Basic Idea  
Footprint concepts are special forms of environmental accounting1. Based on the ecological 
footprint concept developed in the 1990s by Wackernagel and Rees2 , they have seen a meteor­
ic rise in popularity ever since.3 Whilst the ecological footprint represents a cumulative pa­
rameter that regards the many diverse forms of human exploitation of nature and seeks to 
achieve comparability using the global land requirement in hectares as a measure, carbon and 
water footprints each regard only one specific resource and express its exploitation as a quan­
tity of the resource itself. 
The term ecological footprint is understood as a measure of the Earth’s surface needed to en­
able the different lifestyles of people (under present-day conditions of production and con­
sumption). This includes not only areas required for the production of supply goods or the 
supply of energy, but also e.g. for the disposal of waste or for the capture of CO2 released as a 
1 For an overview see, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, An introduction to environmental accounting as a 
business management tool: Key concepts and terms, 1995, with further references.
2 Rees, Environment and Urbanization 1992, 121; Rees/Wackernagel, Environmental Impact Assessment Review 
1996, 223; Wackernagel/Yount, Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 1998, 511.
3 For an overview of the vast number of publications that take the concept as a basis, develop it further and apply
it empirically, see those listed under 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/de/index.php/GFN/page/academic_references. 
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result of human activity.4 The values are given in “global hectares per person and year”.
Hence the concept can be understood as a sustainability indicator.  
Footprint concepts for carbon (carbon footprint) and water (water footprint), although still 
methodologically demanding,5 are far more modest by comparison. They each sum up the
quantities of the resource in question (carbon emissions or water turnover) along value chains
and assign them to specific causally related objects of consideration (products, individuals, 
organisations, countries or events, e.g. travel). Both values therefore convey a quantitative 
measure of the strain that human production and consumption activities place on resources at 
any chosen level of aggregation. In the case of the resource “water”, because water which 
does not physically go into a product, e.g. the water requirement of a tomato or coffee plant, is 
also “moved” along the value chain, this is referred to here as “virtual water”, a term that en­
compasses all life-cycle-related water requirements per cost object (product, individual, com­
pany, country etc.). 
Both concepts – the carbon footprint and the water footprint – have attracted a great deal of
attention in recent years and far outshine all other ecological accounting indicators in the pub­
lic perception. Footprint accounting has become a popular topos that calls upon companies, 
consumers and policy makers to reflect upon their decisions. The scientific literature on the 
topic has literally exploded, and meanwhile an independent field of study has emerged. On 
internet portals, anyone can calculate their own “personal” footprint,6 and companies, gov­
ernment agencies and international organisations are adopting the concepts.7 Footprint ac­
counting also has originated far-reaching implications for climate, environmental, economic 
and trade policy which, however, partly represent problematic over-interpretations (for more
on this, see below). 
All of the ecological accounting concepts mentioned share one common feature: they all aim 
to communicate, on the basis of scientific principles, comprehensible, quantitative insights
into the strain that human activity places on the planet’s limited resources while seeking to
draw maximum public attention to this fact. To a large extent this has proven very successful 
– albeit to varying degrees. Beyond the mere consideration of calculations (positive analysis) 
the concepts simultaneously seek relevance to natural resources policy (normative implica­
tions) (II.).
4 On the methodology, see in particular Borucke et al., Ecological Indicators 2013, 518. 
5 See, e.g., for carbon footprinting, Williams et al., A beginner’s guide to carbon footprinting, Carbon Manage­
ment 2012, 55-67; Wright et al., ‘Carbon footprinting’: towards a universally accepted definition, Carbon Man­
agement 2011, 61-72. 
See alone http://www.footprintnetwork.org/de/index.php/GFN/page/basics_introduction/ or 
http://www.waterfootprint.org/?page=files/home.
7 See, e.g., The Coca Cola Company, The Nature Conservancy, Product water footprint assessments – Practical
applications in corporate water stewardship, 2010; BMU/UBA/Öko-Institut, Memorandum Product Carbon 
Footprint, Position statement on measurement and communication of the product carbon footprint for interna­
tional standardization and harmonization purposes, 2009; Chapagain/Hoekstra, Water footprints of nations,
UNESCO-IHE Value of Water Research Report Series No. 16, 2004.
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II. Footprints as a Concept for Action in Resources Policy  
1. From Measured Value to Normative Concept for Action  
Footprint analysis is not limited to calculating measured values, ensuring that they are metho­
dologically robust, and then making them widely available to the public. The question natural­
ly arises as to what exactly should be done with the information that is made available. There­
fore, parts of the literature go one step further and use these measures as a basis for normative 
concepts for action in resources policy. They not only convey quantitative knowledge, they 
also state how resources-related production and consumption behaviour and global resources-
related policy (climate, environmental, economic and trade policies) should be shaped so as to 
imply the “correct” footprint parameter values. In so doing, they rely on normative evalua­
tions to determine which value ranges of the calculated key indicators should be regarded as 
“better” or “worse” and call for political measures or individual patterns of behaviour in order 
to achieve the desired key figures. 
Thus, for example, the idea is propagated that achieving CO2 neutrality and balancing foot-
print-derived climate impact estimations in an object-related manner is desirable, which is 
why, for instance, companies or organisations which are concerned about the environment or 
their public image seek to compensate their employees’ (air) travel (by investing in rainforest 
reforestation, renewable energies or other climate-friendly measures). It is also suggested that, 
when making decisions, those who know the CO2 footprints for several different policy op­
tions can take these figures into account – if necessary, after weighing other relevant decision-
making factors – for example, by choosing the option with the smaller footprint. In general, 
the aim is to implement “measures to reduce”8 the footprint values. Of course, like all infor­
mational instruments of environmental policy, the question who uses it where and to the best
effect remains open. Here, the carbon footprint has the same effect as an eco-label that implic­
itly calls for reduced consumption.  
Per-capita emissions of CO2 are furthermore an element of the Human Sustainable Develop­
ment Index (HSDI) as well as the United Nations Millennium Development Goal Indicators ( 
MDG Indicators) and the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) formulated in 2015. 
Finally, normative concepts of climate justice partly demand that international climate policy 
be oriented towards an equal global greenhouse gas emissions budget per person.9 
Even further, and at times contradictory, are the resources policy implications of the water 
footprint concept. Here, too, sometimes the idea of a “just” distribution of globally available 
water resources among all inhabitants of the earth (“virtual water for all”10) is a driving force: 
8 See e.g. BMU/BDI, Product-related climate protection strategies. Understanding and using Product Carbon
Footprints, 2010, p. 39, http://www.proesler.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Product-related-climate­
protection-strategies.pdf. 
9 See, e.g., Mohai et al., Environmental Justice, Annual Review of Environment and Resources 2009, 405-430;
in the German-speaking world, e.g., Meyer, Klimagerechtigkeit, 2015; Ekardt (ed.), Klimagerechtigkeit. 
Ethische, rechtliche, ökonomische und transdisziplinäre Zugänge, 2012. 
10 Zehnder, Water Food Nexus, Presentation at the First Water Research Horizon Conference, Berlin, 13 July 
2010. 
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In the industrialised world one would acquire (virtual) water which, in a per capita compari­
son, is far higher than the annual “share” that would be available to an Indian or Zambian, for
instance.11 Other normative approaches aim to increase global “water efficiency” by arranging
trade flows such that water savings can be made globally, for instance, in the supply of water-
intensive agricultural products.12 
Against this background, the global regulation of so-called virtual water flows is widely re­
garded as necessary.13 To support such views, some authors refer to “global justice” consider­
ations and the potential geopolitical consequences of virtual water trade and/or the idea that 
trade flows must be geared towards the criterion of so-called “global water use efficiency”14; 
this is satisfied only by virtual water flows from water-rich to water-poor regions. Corre­
sponding regulation proposals range from international agreements on cross-border water 
taxes, which are supposed to open the eyes of consumers in industrialised countries to the 
costs of their behaviour,15 to tradeable water-footprint certificates. Such licenses are supposed 
to be distributed to all countries according to their “rightful” share in the sustainable con­
sumption of globally available water resources. This means that additional rights would have
to be obtained for an “above-average” per capita water footprint, whereas people with below-
average consumption would have to receive a compensation, whereby the tradability of the 
rights is by no means regarded as mandatory.16 The supposed task of virtual water taxes is 
therefore to bring the consumption of virtual water in industrialised nations to an appropriate 
level, in other words, to reduce the “flow” of virtual water into those countries. On top of that 
comes the proposal to introduce a “pollution tax” on products which, during the disposal 
phase, cause water contamination. In particular, this is intended to combat nutrient contamina­
tion in densely populated areas, which can be viewed in the same way as soil leaching in areas 
of intensive farming. This problem of the unclosed nutrient cycle, which arises especially with 
international trade in foodstuffs, would have to be regulated at the global level, if necessary, 
by shipping foodstuffs or manure back to the place of manufacture.17 
In this way, massive interventions in global trade flows are propagated solely from a “virtual 
water” perspective and, what’s more, in widely varying directions, depending on which nor­
mative concept is taken as a basis. In the process, practically everything – the import of virtu­
11 Hoekstra, The Global Dimension of Water Governance: Nine Reasons for Global Arrangements in Order to
Cope With Local Water Problems, UNESCO-IHE Value of Water Research Report Series, 2006, pp. 17 ff.
12 Allen, Groundwater 1998, 545. 
13 See e.g. Daly/Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment
and a Sustainable Future, 1994. For a critical view of the concept of global water governance see: Gaw-
el/Bernsen, Nature and Culture 2011, 205. 
14 Hoekstra/Hung, Virtual Water Trade: A Quantification of Virtual Water Flows Between Nations in Relation to
International Crop Trade, in: Hoekstra, Virtual Water Trade – Proceedings of the International Expert Meeting 
on Virtual Water Trade, UNESCO IHE Delft Value of Water Research Report Series No. 12, 2003, p. 26. 
15 Hoff, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2009, 144.
16 Hoekstra, Water 2011, 33, 37 f.
17 Ibid., p. 34 f. 
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al water, its export, and even internal consumption – could ever be characterised as morally 
questionable (Tab. 1).18 
Table 1: Normative Valuations of Indicators of Virtual Water  
and Associated Problem Areas19 
Indicator … … is defined as problematic if … Dimension of the problem
Trade 
regime
Consumption 
pattern 
Local 
effects in 
the export­
ing coun­
try 
Water footprint 
of a product
- “high“ X X 
Water footprint 
of an individual 
- “high“ 
- above the global average  
X X 
Trade balance 
of a country 
in relation to 
virtual water
- positive 
- negative 
- balanced in the case of unequal dis­
tribution of global water resources 
X X X 
Inter-regional 
trade flows in 
relation to virtu-
al water
- from north to south
- from south to north
- not correlated with relative water 
availability 
X X 
These few comments may be enough to illustrate that, far beyond their genuine (and limited)
informational content and the awareness-creating functions so often ascribed to them, foot­
print concepts are meant to legitimise far-reaching resources policy implications that have
very significant economic, ecological and social effects. It is all the more crucial to clarify
precisely what concrete, methodologically determined informational content these key param­
eters do actually have (quite apart from the data problems), whether any action based on this 
information can address the identified problem at all (effectiveness), and whether a euro de­
ployed to reduce these key parameters can have the greatest possible effect in relation to the
problem in question (efficiency). 
18 On the arbitrary nature of normatively turned water footprint implications see Gawel/Bernsen, Environment 
and Planning C (Government and Policy) 2013, 168. 
19 Source: Simplified after Gawel, Virtual Water and Trade: A Critical Economic Review, in: Bhaduri et al. 
(eds.): The Global Water System in the Anthropocene, 2015, 31 ff.
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2. Normative Basis and Informational Requirements for Footprint-Based Sustainable Action  
If footprint figures are to be used responsibly as a basis for action in the area of resources pol­
icy, it is important to first expose and reach an understanding about the respective normative 
concepts underlying policy recommendations concerning the “right” handling of resources. 
Otherwise the policy recommendations are wrongly lent the authority of spuriously accurate 
calculations, which cannot correspond with specific policy implications to begin with. So, for 
instance, it is necessary to clarify whether recommendations for reducing key figures of virtu­
al water follow considerations of global “water use efficiency”, or rather, fairness-based valu­
ations, which would still have to be specified in detail.   
If efforts towards reducing the utilisation of resources indicated by the measured values are to
be effective, the environmental problem expressed through the key figure must be addressed 
directly. This means that the consumption of the resource measured by the key parameter 
must have a clear and stable functional relationship to the environmental problem itself. This 
is the case for the carbon footprint, because each unit of emission of a CO2 equivalent is rele­
vant to climate in the same way globally, but not for the water footprint, which, in its simple 
form, adds up quantities of water across the entire globe which were deployed under the wide­
ly varying conditions depending on the respective regional water balance and its utilisation. 
Whether rain-fed agriculture or irrigation farming, whether the region is humid or arid, 
whether water is used sustainably or mismanaged – here, a litre is above all a litre.20 
Ultimately, in order for such a recommended reduction of footprint values to be economically
efficient as well, measures must be taken precisely where they will have the greatest effect per 
euro spent. It would not make any sense to haphazardly implement just any reductions; rather, 
each measure should be coordinated so that it has the greatest possible environmental effect 
for the limited economic resources used to reduce them or, in the reverse, that to achieve a 
certain environmental effect the lowest possible value consumption occurs. In short: the so-
called economic principle should be observed (best possible target achievement for the given 
resources deployed or minimisation of the resources needed to achieve a given target). But 
footprint indicators alone are quite fundamentally not in a position to do so. This is because 
the respective opportunity costs must be known in order to decide where reductions can rea­
sonably be made. Only then can the total value of the cuts that have to be made in order to 
limit the consumption of resources to a certain degree be minimised. 
In that sense, neither the CO2 neutralisation of business travel nor the decision in favour of a 
policy alternative with the lower CO2 footprint is economically efficient. In all probability, the 
euro amounts that are respectively deployed here to reduce greenhouse gas emissions might 
have a far greater effect if deployed elsewhere. But for the decision maker, who sees only the 
footprint calculations, this remains unclear. Although the footprint-based setting of standards 
(building standards, energy efficiency standards) constituted a contribution to climate protec­
tion, such standards typically all remain economically inefficient due to the lack of infor­
20 On refinements of the concept, which however do not solve the problem, see Gawel/Bernsen, GAiA 2011, 
224; Gawel, in: Bhaduri et al. (eds.), The Global Water System in the Anthropocene, 2014, pp. 48 ff. 
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mation and consideration of opportunity costs for which there is only decentralized 
knowledge. 
So, a mechanism that coordinates reduction efforts efficiently is still lacking. For this purpose, 
a comparison of the individual marginal costs of abatement with the benefits of lower utilisa­
tion of resources is required. A CO2 tax or trade in CO2 emissions are examples of such in­
struments. They create public scarcity signals about the use of resources which allow individ­
uals to make efficient reduction decisions using only the individual opportunity costs known 
to them and the comparison with the scarcity signal. If such a coordination mechanism is 
lacking and individuals have to decide on the basis of the quantity information of the footprint 
alone, inefficient decisions will result because the condition for economic freedom from
waste, technically speaking, the balancing of the marginal costs of abatement to the conserva­
tion of resources over different individuals, is bound to be missed.   
Whilst it is possible to use information on the carbon footprint, at least for such complemen­
tary coordination instruments, it is not at all possible for the water footprint because of the 
lack of homogeneity of the measured and purely quantitatively aggregated environmental ef­
fects (III.): So, while knowledge about the carbon footprint is “merely” not yet sufficient to 
make reasonable decisions about the conservation of resources, the water footprint is a priori 
entirely unsuitable for the task.
III. Carbon Footprint and Water Footprint: Incomplete Information  
Problems – Differences and Commonalities
As illustrated under point I. above, both footprint concepts attempt to describe the strain on
global resources in concrete quantitative terms through the specific unit responsible for the 
resource consumption (product, person, country etc.). Both are pure measures of quantity 
which aggregate the global use of the resource for a certain balance group (product, person, 
country etc.) and are not able to make any value statements about the costs or benefits of a 
reduction of the values. Therefore neither of these concepts alone can guide economically
meaningful action on the basis of mere knowledge of the footprint data, because for this pur­
pose value information is always required (see point II. above). The German Federal Envi­
ronment Agency is therefore justifiably cautious in its position on the carbon footprint: it 
points out that the purely numerical value of the CO2 footprint is of little use to the consumer
since a standard of comparison is lacking, the values fail to lead to policy recommendations 
for optimal utilization from the climate perspective, because other environmental aspects are 
ignored and ultimately it has been more a source of confusion than orientation for consum­
ers.
In addition, the water footprint also has more serious methodological weaknesses which dis­
tinguish it from the carbon footprint and at the same time fundamentally call into question its
21 BMU/UBA/Öko-Institut, Memorandum Product Carbon Footprint. Position statement on measurement and 
communication of the product carbon footprint for international standardization and harmonization purposes, 
2009. 
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suitability as a basis for decision making. While the carbon footprint indicates the aggregated 
global per-unit burden of greenhouse gases that lead to the same climate effects and which to 
that extent are comparable with one another, the water footprint combines completely dispar­
ate water uses and their ecological impacts in one figure.22 As has been shown, even the car-
bon footprint still cannot deliver any direct information about the desirability of an activity or 
its abatement, because additional information about the abatement costs and benefits of a 
product or activity are required for this. However, this missing information can be provided 
efficiently by complementary coordination mechanisms (CO2 tax, equilibrium price generated 
by CO2 emissions trading). However, in the case of the water footprint, even the most basic
requirement, the homogeneity of the measured resource implications, is lacking. 
From an ecological as well as from an economic standpoint, the consumption of one cubic 
metre of water clearly does not have the same environmental effects (environmental costs) 
everywhere. First and foremost, local conditions such as water availability and cultivation 
conditions play a crucial role: One cubic metre of water from Egypt is therefore not compara­
ble with one cubic metre of water from Germany; the same water use can, in the one case,
cause serious environmental damage or involve social waste, and in the other case be com­
pletely sustainable. Therefore, it is impossible to make general statements about the desirabil­
ity of a certain level of a water footprint, because they contain neither information about the 
sustainability of water use in the exporting country nor about the value placed on the good in
question in the importing country. In the end, whether local water resources should be used in 
the production of export goods or whether more valuable alternative uses exist can only be 
decided locally according to the opportunity costs of production: Thus, for example, the de­
ployment of scarce water to produce a very highly valued good can make good economic
sense.23 What is important is that each factor of production is deployed according to its actual 
scarcity, that these scarcities are accurately reflected in consumer prices24 and that the re­
quirements of sustainability and good governance are complied with when using water. In any 
event, whether this is case or not cannot be inferred from a water footprint.  
Also, regarding a concept of “water neutrality”25, it is by no means irrelevant where the con­
sumption of a certain quantity of water is compensated, because the environmental effects of 
water use are a local or regional problem. That the idea of saving water in one part of the 
world in order to “free it up”26 for other regions does not seem very helpful is also reflected in
the sharp critique of the European Commission’s deliberations on introducing uniform Eu­
22 Ridoutt/Pfister, Global Environmental Change 2010, 113.
23 Wichelns, International Journal of Water Resources Development 2010, 647 f.
24 A “correct” price in this sense also comprises potential environmental costs (such as pollution caused by ferti­
lisers, pesticides and salinisation) that arise in the producing country. 
25 Hoekstra, Water Neutral: Reducing and Offsetting the Impacts of Water Footprints, UNESCO-IHE Value of
Water Research Report Series Nr. 28, 2008. Dazu zu Recht sehr kritisch O‘Neill, There’s another word for ‘wa­
ter neutrality’: death, http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/5603.
26 Hoekstra/Chapagain/Aldaya/Mekonnen, Water Footprint Manual, State of the Art 2009, Water Footprint Re­
port, 2009, p. 68. 
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rope-wide building standards in relation to water efficiency27, because, ultimately, water 
saved in Germany is not going to tackle a drought in Spain.28 
The water footprint’s inherent violation of the homogeneity requirement means that the pa­
rameter is rendered on the whole useless due to the lack of exploitable information, and that 
the economic decisions of businesses and consumers, but also national and international envi­
ronment, water and trade policies, cannot be properly guided by it (IV.). 
IV. The Limitations and Problems of Footprints
 – Based on the Example of Virtual Water Trading 
Global analyses of the water footprint swiftly focus attention on international trade with agri­
cultural products.29 This is because 70% of all water withdrawals are used for agricultural 
purposes, with low and frequently subsidised water prices contributing to wasteful handling of 
the scarce resource.30 The connections between international trade, food security and the local 
use of water resources have recently been attracting greater attention; water footprints play a 
major role here in that they are supposed to say something about what global trade should 
look like from a water resources standpoint.  
International trade is ultimately based on a country’s comparative cost advantages in the pro­
duction of a specific good, which can be attributed, among other things, to the abundance of
certain natural resources. If a country is particularly rich in one factor (e.g. water), that factor 
is relatively cheap in comparison to other factors of production, giving the country a cost ad­
vantage for goods that use that factor particularly intensively in production (e.g. rice). Hence, 
free trade essentially serves to increase welfare on all sides by giving rise to an efficient inter­
national division of labour based on specialization and exchange, which increases prosperity 
for all participating countries. Moreover, water can be used precisely where it is most abun­
dantly available and where its use causes the least opportunity and environmental cost. In ad­
dition, through trade, countries with fewer natural resources are able to enjoy essential com­
modities: For Israel, the importing of virtual water is just as essential to survival as the supply 
of imported raw materials is for Germany. Also, for many countries, the virtual “water losses” 
incurred through the export of agricultural products represent an important source of revenue
for exchanging other goods against them on the global market.  
Even so, for good economic reasons, the resulting trade flows by no means accurately reflect 
the trading partners’ water scarcity because besides water, the availability of land, manpower 
and cultivation techniques also play a role in agricultural production:31 The Netherlands has 
an abundant supply of water, but arable land is scarce and therefore it is an “importer” of vir­
27 European Commission, Water Scarcity and Droughts – 2012 Policy Review – Building Blocks, 2010. 

28 Kleinhubbert, Schwacher Strahl, Spiegel-Online, 27/09/2010, www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,719873,00.html. 

29 For an overview see Gawel/Bernsen, Environment and Planning C (Government and Policy) 2013, 168.
 
30 OECD, Managing Water for All – An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, 2009, p. 32.
 
31 Wichelns, Agricultural Water Management 2004, 49 ff. 
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tual water – in contrast to Kazakhstan, which for the same reason in reverse order appears as
an “exporter”. For this reason, ideas about organising trade flows on the basis of “global water 
use efficiency” 32 also are also economically misguided. But at the same time, and partly by
the same authors, the organisation of virtual water trade along “fairness gradients”33 is propa­
gated, which can only inadvertently coincide with the outcome using the criterion of “global 
water use efficiency”. 
From an economic perspective, the consumption of water does not result in the same envi­
ronmental effects and opportunity costs everywhere, but rather regional conditions such as 
water availability, alternative water uses, cultivation conditions and preferences play a deci­
sive role. It should be left to each country itself to decide whether it will use its national water 
supplies to grow agricultural products for export and thus get access to, for instance, power 
plants or other high-tech products on the world market.  
These deliberations show that an indicator such as the water footprint, which is based purely 
on volume, is hardly suitable for exposing water-related issues, let alone for helping to solve
them34 regardless of how detailed water footprint analysis might become in the future. At any 
rate, which would be the “right” direction for virtual water flows does not emerge from the
normative critique of trade in virtual water: is it north-south trade that should be prevented on
the grounds of the dependencies that result, or south-north trade on the grounds of our “ex­
ploitative” consumption patterns, or possibly even water-based trading as a whole? The water 
footprint offers no specific value information based on which economically and ecologically 
“right” trading decisions could be made; in addition, the normative “thinking framework” 
behind the concept of the water footprint is in itself contradictory and would only allow one to 
conclude that each country should budget with the resources it can find on its own territory. 
But the idea of throwing every economy back to relying on their own regionally available 
natural resources and denying them the opportunity to trade that potential on the world market 
in order to increase welfare is downright grotesque. If the idea of resource autonomy emerges
behind the concept in order to ward off trade “injustices” and degradation of the environment
through agriculture, under the banner of water protection, a programme of global impover­
ishment threatens.35 
Comparisons between country and per-capita consumptions are also, in principle, of little rel­
evance, because a person living in a water-rich country will naturally consume different wa­
ter-intensive goods than a person living in a water-poor country, and will possibly have other 
preferences and habits too. Different water footprints are not just simply attributable to differ­
ences in living standards and these, in turn, are not directly related to sustainability in the 
management of water resources. Comparisons between different degrees of “externalization”
of water consumption (transferring the use of water to other countries) or dependencies on 
32 Hoekstra/Hung (fn. 14), p. 26. 
33 Verkerk/Hoekstra/Gerbens-Leenes, Global Water Governance: Conceptual Design of Global Institutional
Arrangements, UNESCO-IHE Value of Water Research Report Series No. 26, 2008, p. 31 ff. 
34 See also Wichelns, Water productivity and water footprints are not helpful in determining optimal water allo­
cations or efficient management strategies, Water International 2015, 1059. 
35 Gawel/Bernsen, Wirtschaftsdienst 2011, 558, 563. 
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imports are also of little informative value, because, here, countries with a large surface area 
like Argentina are compared with small, densely populated countries like the Netherlands 
which are naturally more dependent on food imports, which similarly is not a problem in it­
self. What we should be concerned about is the sustainability of agricultural cultivation pro­
cesses, the legitimation of regional process of making decisions about scarce water resources
and the fairness of the global trade regime, not cross-border trade in water-intensive goods.  
General trade-restrictive measures, such as a tax on traded virtual water, should thus be re­
jected from an economic perspective because they limit voluntary and mutually beneficial 
trading and distort the prices of products, that is, they limit their ability to accurately reflect 
costs and scarcity. Welfare losses would result. In addition, they make no contribution to im­
proving the global sustainability of regional water balances, because all water-intensive prod­
ucts would be subject to across-the-board price increases. A differentiation according to place 
of production and water source would be practically impossible to implement36 and would 
probably be difficult to convey to the affected countries as well. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, a specific water use can be wasteful in one country and make complete sense in anoth­
er. For a start, such a tax would worsen the revenue situation of local producers, while the 
sustainability or non-sustainability of the local water management would remain the same;
whether the desired environmental improvement would kick in is unclear.  
The fact that trade barriers are not specific enough to combat local environmental problems
has been discussed often enough.37 Thus, increased demand through the liberalisation of trade 
can also raise the price of goods produced using a particular resource, which would increase 
the value of the resource and the incentive to conserve it and manage it sustainably, while 
trade barriers would have the opposite effect. By the same token, a deterioration in the income
situation of local producers does not contribute to raising appreciation and awareness for a 
sustainable management of resources.38 The most efficient solution would therefore be to re­
move the distortion which represents the root of the problem, in this case, too low, subsidised
water prices in the agricultural sector as well as removing regional structures of bad govern-
ance. Because the problem of undemocratic, corrupt structures which facilitate excessive ex­
ploitation of resources would clearly not be solved with blanket trade barriers.39 
Similarly, a system of (tradeable) water footprints can only lead to distortions, because it ig­
nores people’s preferences. In addition, water-rich countries would be denied the “right” to 
use domestic water resources as they see fit: For instance, if a water-rich country could al­
ready reach an “above-average” level of consumption through its own resources: Should the 
acquisition/buying of additional footprint licenses or even forced deliveries of virtual water 
then be the consequence? Then there is the other question of whether poor, but water-rich 
36 LeVernoy, Water and the WTO: Don’t Kill the Messenger, paper presented at the workshop “Accounting for 
Water Scarcity and Pollution in the Rules of International Trade”, 25-26 November 2010, p. 10 f.
37 See alone Bhagwati, Scientific American 1993, 18; Siebert, Trade policy and environmental protection, Work­
ing Paper 730, Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1996. 
38 See Schulz, Environmental and Resource Economics 1996, 20 ff.
39 Damania, Trade and the Political Economy of Renewable Resource Management, CIES Discussion Paper No. 
0046, 2000. 
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countries, like for instance Bangladesh, should “share” their water resources. Sustainable wa­
ter use in production would hardly be served by this because, in the case of water as a local 
resource, a national or global “cap” is not very helpful if water is not used efficiently at the 
local level. Then, if water - for instance as an input in agricultural production - were to be 
remunerated in accordance with its scarcity, the purchasing of additional certificates would no 
longer be required for “above-average” levels of consumption. How such an instrument could 
lead to a “fair distribution” of water resources is also not clear since the water footprint certif­
icates would ultimately be traded according to a country’s ability to pay, while the problem of 
differences in development and income would hardly be solved. Instead, both instruments – 
virtual water taxes and certificates – display characteristics of paternalism and patronization 
by forcing people (especially in developing countries) to choose the “right” level of consump­
tion, production or exports. The concept that certain countries are not capable of determining 
the water and trade strategy that is best for themselves, but rather are dependent on corrective 
measures in the context of a global water management system at the same time reveals a ques­
tionable affinity to forms of “eco-imperialism”.40 
V. Conclusion: On the Significance of Footprints for Resources Policy 
Footprint concepts have managed to attract a great deal of scientific and public attention in a 
short space of time. Beyond the mere production of “figures”, these concepts are increasingly 
being used as a scientific basis for normatively guided policy recommendations on the man­
agement of resources. So, might the various ecological accounting concepts which have been 
developed and continuously perfected over the past few years at the same time provide suita­
ble starting points for legislation on the protection of natural resources? Their suitability can
be confirmed only very partially. Footprint concepts, taken in isolation, do not provide 
enough information for consumers, companies, government agencies or policy makers to 
make economically “right” decisions. They suffer from a lack of complementary value infor­
mation about the utility of natural resources conservation. However, this value information 
could by all means be provided by complementary instruments such as a CO2 tax or a CO2 
emissions trading system. For the water footprint, this is not possible either, because the con­
cept fails to meet the basic requirement of homogeneity of the effects of the summed up water 
quantities. 
In the context of this certainly critical41 debate, footprint concepts are often adjudged particu­
larly suitable for exposing the implications of global consumption and for raising awareness 
40 Siebert, Trade Policy and Environmental Protection, Kieler Arbeitspapiere No. 730, 1996, p. 3.
41 For more on this, see for instance the massive criticism of water footprints from the environmental and agri­
economics as well as hydrological perspective in Wichelns, Agricultural Water Management 2004, 49; idem, 
Water Resources Management 2010, 2203; idem, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 2010, 
639; idem, GAiA 2011, 171; idem, Water International 2015, 1059; Meran, The unimportance of “virtual water“ 
for environmental policy, http://www.infraday.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg280/ veranstaltung­
en/infraday/conference_2011/papers_presentations/presentation---meran.pdf; Perry, Agricultural Water Man­
agement 2014, 119; Gawel/Bernsen, Environment and Planning C (Government and Policy) 2013, 168; dies.,
GAiA 2011, 162; Gawel, in: Bhaduri et al. (eds.), The Global Water System in the Anthropocene, 2014, 48.  
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in this regard.42 However, the question is, what concrete benefit can such information and the 
new awareness based on that information provide if the key indicators supplied cannot guide 
concrete individual action in any meaningful way and even lead to serious decision-making 
mistakes (pointless avoidance of certain products such as coffee from rain-fed crops, misallo­
cation of resource conservation funds)? This doesn’t affect the fact that aligning one’s behav­
iour towards a low-carbon society may be rational at the individual level, for instance as a 
marketing tool to demonstrate orientation to climate and environmental concerns outwardly 
and to benefit from this commercially or in some other way43 (e.g. German Rail highlights its 
eco-friendliness).
However, if you ask whether the water footprint reveals any important information about the 
use of scarce water resources and whether it can guide water-related economic and political 
decisions in any useful way, the answer in each case is clearly no.44 The concept of virtual 
water, in particular, is likely to remain an academic Glass Bead Game; at any rate it does not 
quality as a guideline for global water governance or for individual action and can – like all 
purely quantity-based concepts in environmental policy45 – contribute to quite alarming diso­
rientation. Normative interpretations of the concept are contradictory; in some circumstances
it makes no contribution at all to meeting the self-defined water conservation and sustainabil­
ity targets, but in other circumstances it implies massive inefficiencies and distortions in 
world trade and appears in essence paternalistic. International environmental and trade policy 
should not internalise the supposed policy implications of “virtual water calculations”. Above 
all, there must be no unseen transfer from the carbon footprint to the water footprint. The 
methodological differences between the two concepts are too great for this. 
So, footprint calculations alone cannot provide a reliable foundation for resource protection 
policy. In the future, they must continue to obtain their objective legitimacy in the conven­
tional manner, for example through politically defined climate protection or water protection 
targets. In particular, for economic reasons, there should be no implementation of mandatory 
product standards merely based on footprints.46 
42 See for instance Biewald, GAiA 2011, 168; Biewald/Rolinski, GAiA 2012, 88.
43 For a recent competition law perspective on this, see Roller, ZUR 2014, 211. 
44 See also references mentioned in fn. 41. 
45 These include the Wuppertal Institute’s so-called dematerialisation approach – see on this Gawel, Applied
Economics Quarterly 1998, 173. 
46 This ultimately also includes the EU-wide light bulb ban, although the use of carbon footprints for the purpose
of argument in the area of energy efficiency is unusual. Quite rightly critical of a standards-oriented energy effi­
ciency policy in the interests of climate protection are Mennel/Sturm, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 2009, 3. 
For a legal analysis of the topic see Jesse, in: Reimer (ed.), Ressourceneffizienz – Leitbild für das Umweltrecht?, 
2016, p. 165 ff. 
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